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Abstract
We apply a paraconsistent strategy to reason about fractions.
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1 Introduction
Suppose we want to define an arithmetic framework in which it is possible to
reason about fractions in a consistent and reliable way and in which the usual
laws of arithmetic hold: e.g. for natural numbers n, l and k 6= 0 6= m the
equations
n
m
+
l
k
=
nk + lm
mk
and
n
m
+
l
m
=
n+ l
m
should be valid. At the same time, we want to consider fractions as mathe-
matical expressions with typical syntactic operations like the numerator num( )
satisfying
num(
n
m
) = n.
Then equational logic dictates
n+ l = num(
n+ l
m
) = num(
n
m
+
l
m
) = num(
nm+ lm
mm
) = nm+ lm.
for arbitrary l, n and m 6= 0, and our framework is inconsistent. Nevertheless,
fractions are of great practical and abstract importance and we should be able
to reason about them without lapsing into absurdity.
In mathematics education, one can get around this predicament in various
ways: avoiding the concepts of numerator and denominator (see e.g. [8]), viewing
fractions as heterogeneous subject (see e.g. [7]), or accepting cognitive conflicts
(see e.g. [9]). In this note, we propose to apply paraconsistent reasoning.
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A paraconsistent logic is a way to reason about inconsistent information
without exploding in the sense that if a contradiction is obtained, then every-
thing can be obtained. Paraconsistent logics come in a broad spectrum, ranging
from logics with the thought that if a contradiction were true, then everything
would be true, to logics that claim that some contradictions really are true. In
this note, we choose a particular paraconsistent reasoning strategy to tackle the
dilemma sketched above. We do not claim that this is the only possible way how
to proceed in our scenario; other paraconsistent approaches may be suitable as
well.
2 The C & P structure
The approach taken here belongs to the preservationist school. The fundamental
idea is that, given an inconsistent collection of premises, one should not try to
reason about the collection of premises as a whole, but rather focus on internally
consistent subsets of premises. In 2004, Brown and Priest [4] introduced the
Chunk and Permeate (C & P) strategy for dealing with reasoning situations
involving incompatible assumptions. In this reasoning strategy, a theory is
broken up into chunks and only restricted information is allowed to pass from
one chunk to another. In what follows we give a precise rendering of this idea.
Let L be some classical language and let ⊢ be an appropriate classical conse-
quence relation. If Γ is a set of sentences in L, Γ⊢ denotes the closure of Γ under
⊢. A covering of Γ is a set {Γi | i ∈ I} of classical consistent sets of sentences
such that Γ =
⋃
i∈I Γi. If C = {Γi | i ∈ I} is a covering of Γ, a permeability
relation ρ on C is a map from I × I to sets of sentences of L. If i0 ∈ I, 〈C, ρ, i0〉
is called a C & P structure on Γ.
If P = 〈C, ρ, i0〉 is a C & P structure on Γ and A is a sentence in the language
under consideration, then
Γ ⊢P A if and only if A ∈ Γ
ω
i0
where
Γ0i = Γ
⊢
i
Γn+1i = (Γ
n
i ∪
⋃
j∈I(Γ
n
j ∩ ρ(j, i)))
⊢.
The C & P consequences of Γ are thus sentences that can be inferred in the
designated chunk i0 when information has been allowed to flow from other
chunks along the permeability relation.
In our case, a simple binary C & P structure will be sufficient. We partition
our inconsistent theory into two chunks: the source chunk ΓS and the target
chunk ΓT . The flow of information is from the former to the latter only and the
target chunk is the output chunk. Note that in this case, ΓωS = Γ
⊢
S and hence
ΓωT = Γ
1
T = (ΓT ∪ (Γ
⊢
S ∩ ρ(S, T )))
⊢.
We let L be the language of equational logic with terms over the two-sorted
signature Σ containing 0, 1, the numerator and denominator num and denom,
2
n+ 0 = n (1)
(n+m) + l = n+ (m+ l) (2)
n+m = m+ n (3)
n · 1 = n (4)
(n ·m) · l = n · (m · l) (5)
n ·m = m · n (6)
n · (m+ l) = n ·m+ n · l (7)
m 6= 0 6= k →
n
m
·
l
k
=
n · l
m · k
(8)
m 6= 0 6= k →
n
m
+
l
k
=
n · k + l ·m
m · k
(9)
m 6= 0→
n
m
+
l
m
=
n+ l
m
(10)
(α+ β) + γ = α+ (β + γ) (11)
α+ β = β + α (12)
(α · β) · γ = α · (β · γ) (13)
α · β = β · α (14)
α · (β + γ) = α · β + α · γ (15)
m 6= 0 ∧ m 6= a → num(
n
m
) = n (16)
m 6= 0 ∧ n 6= a → denom(
n
m
) = m (17)
Table 1: The inconsistent equational theory Γ
the fraction , symbols for addition and multiplication of natural numbers and
fractions, respectively, and an additional error element a produced by division
by zero. The inconsistent theory Γ is the equational theory of the set of axioms
given in Table 1. Here k, l,m, n range over natural numbers, and α, β, γ denote
fractions. The binary C & P structure for our problem is 〈{ΓS,ΓT }, ρ, T 〉 where
• the source chunk ΓS is the theory of the axioms (1) – (8), (11) – (17) of
Table 1 and the axioms (18) and (19) of Table 2,
• the target chunk ΓT consists of the axiom (20) of Table 2, and
• the information ρ that is allowed to flow from source to target consists of
the axioms of the source except for (16) and (17).
Observe that in the source, fractions with identical denominators can be
3
m 6= 0→
n
m
=
n
1
·
1
m
(18)
n
1
+
m
1
=
n+m
1
(19)
m 6= 0 6= k →
n · k
m · k
=
n
m
(20)
Table 2: Alternative axioms for source and target
added (†): for m 6= 0 we have
n
m
+
k
m
=
n
1
·
1
m
+
k
1
·
1
m
(18)
= (
n
1
+
k
1
) ·
1
m
(6), (7)
=
n+ k
1
·
1
m
(19)
=
n+ k
m
(18)
This fact together with axiom (20) yields axiom (9). Thus {ΓS ,ΓT } covers Γ.
That ΓS is consistent can be seen as follows. We let M be the Σ-algebra with
the sorts Na = N ∪ {a} and F = N× N where the operations are interpreted as
follows. If ◦ ∈ {+, ·}, then ◦ : Na × Na → Na is defined by
x ◦ y =
{
x ◦ y if x, y ∈ N
a otherwise,
and : Na × Na → F is defined by
x
y
=
{
(x, y) if x ∈ N, y ∈ N
(0, 0) otherwise,
num, denom : F → Na are defined by
num((n,m)) =
{
n if m 6= 0
a otherwise,
and
denom((n,m)) =
{
m if m 6= 0
a otherwise,
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and +, · : F× F → F are defined by
(n,m) + (l, k) =
{
(n+ l,m) if m = k 6= 0
(0, 0) otherwise,
and
(n,m) · (l, k) =
{
(nl,mk) if m 6= 0 6= k
(0, 0) otherwise.
Note that M does not satisfy the full axiom of fraction addition (9). It is easy
to see that M is a model for ΓS . Clearly, ΓT is consistent. ΓT ∪ ρ is consistent
too: Q0 and Qa —the zero-totalized and the a-totalized meadow of the rational
numbers (see e.g. [1, 3]), respectively—are both models of ΓT ∪ ρ. We have
thus arrived at a consistent theory where we have full addition of fractions: for
m 6= 0 6= l
n
m
+
k
l
=
nl
ml
+
km
lm
(20)
=
nl
ml
+
km
ml
(6)
=
nl + km
ml
(†).
3 Conclusion
M is only one of a number of possible structures that incorporate fractions in
such a manner that the oprations numerator and denominator can be properly
defined. We do not exclude that more convincing datatypes can be found as
models for ΓS . For instance with / representing integer division, the defining
equation
n
m
+
k
l
=
(n · l + k ·m)/gcd(m, l)
m · l/gcd(m, l)
is compatible with having functions num and denom around in combination
with associativity and the rule
n
m
+
k
m
=
n+ k
m
.
We will not explore such alternatives in this note. For meadows different from
common meadows see e.g. [2].
The relation between the views ΓS and ΓT requires further attention. Fol-
lowing the original line of thought, ΓS is a stepping stone towards ΓT which
in our case implies that the application of the C & P strategy does not lead
to a picture where fractions and rationals coexist with the operations num and
denom.
It seems plausible to imagine that a person thinking along these lines about
fractions switches back and forth between ΓS and ΓT . The situation may then be
5
compared with how a human observer looks at the Necker cube [5, 6]. This cube
is a 2-dimensional figure which invites an observer to “see” in an alternating
manner two different 3-dimensional interpretations of it. Instead of the 3rd
dimension we consider a logic, informally understood. And ΓS and ΓT represent
two logics of fractions the alternation of which seems to be adequately described
by the inconsistency-tolerant technique of C & P.
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